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Abstract. 
 
This article argues that the stalling of the Doha Round negotiations is a forsaken 
opportunity for developing countries. Since the first deadline of Doha Round was missed 
in 2005, developed countries have changed their strategy of achieving free trade through 
multilateral negotiations, towards achieving it in regional or bilateral negotiations. 
Therefore, developing countries have had to stop bargaining in a considerable less 
hierarchical system and being compelled to bargain in a scenario characterized by power 
asymmetries. They have also swapped free trade based on non-discriminative multilateral 
principles, for preferential and discriminative trade treatment.  
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1. Introduction 
 
For the last decade, WTO members have been negotiating free trade liberalization under 
the Doha Round. However, the negotiation deadlines have not been met, leading to the 
absence of an agreement, which is why the Doha Round is stalled while the number of 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) has increased. The stalling of Doha Round negotiations is a 
missed opportunity for developing countries because multilateral negotiations were 
replaced by bilateral and regional negotiations. As a result, developing countries stopped 
bargaining in a considerable less hierarchical system and began to bargain in a scenario 
characterized by power asymmetries. They have also swapped free trade based on non-
discriminative multilateral rules for preferential and discriminative trade rules. 
 
Multilateral trade negotiations are considerably less hierarchical because during Doha 
Round negotiations, developing countries created a more equal decision making process, 
increasing their influence in setting the negotiation agenda, raising their bargaining power 
by building coalitions and improving their efficiency in the negotiations.  
 
On the other hand, bilateral and regional negotiations are characterized by power 
asymmetries among the members. In FTAs the negotiation agenda is set by developed 
countries according with their interests. Therefore, the negotiation agenda is unbalanced. 
It goes further than current WTO agreements but excludes important issues for 
developing countries like agricultural subsidies; therefore developing countries cannot 
balance the power building coalitions. 
 
FTAs are also preferential and discriminative. Thus, developed countries have used them 
as stick and carrot strategy. In the WTO this strategy cannot be used due to the Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) principle. Finally, FTAs divert trade and reduce the world´s wealth 
whilst WTO agreements create trade and increase the world´s wealth. 
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In order to emphasize the importance of this perspective, I begin by explaining the change 
from multilateral negotiations to bilateral and regional negotiations. Then I continue 
showing how developing countries have reduced the hierarchy in the WTO.  Following, I 
illustrate how FTAs are ruled by power asymmetries and its consequences for developing 
countries. In the next section, I explain the disadvantages of having preferential and 
discriminatory trade rules and the advantages of having multilateral rules and MFN for 
developing countries. Finally, I clarify how FTAs divert trade and reduce the world´s wealth 
and how WTO agreements create trade and increase the world´s wealth. 
 
 
2. From Multilateral Negotiations to Bilateral and Regional 
Negotiations: The Effect of Doha stalling  
 
According with Adam Smith´s (1776) Absolute Advantage theory and David Ricardo´s 
(1817) Comparative Advantage theory, if each country specializes in the production of 
those goods that it is most efficient at producing, and later trades them (in a free 
international market) in order to get the goods to meet its necessities, the wealth for each 
country and for the whole world will increase. Based on these theories, since the 1980s 
the world has moved toward deeper free trade liberalization (Milner, 1999) and 
developing countries have seen free trade as the solution for economic development 
(Rodrick, 1994).  
 
Under this economic scenario, in November of 1982 the members of the General 
Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) planted the seed to initiate the Uruguay Round. 
This round was officially launched in September 1986 and was finished in 1994 with the 
signature of the new agreement which created the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Basically, the new agreement covers goods under the 1994 GATT, services under the GATS 
and intellectual property under the TRIPS. It also establishes the WTO as a negotiating 
forum, as a set of rules and as a dispute settlement body (WTO, 2010 a).   
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With the purpose of continuing trade liberalization under the WTO, its members started 
new negotiations between them on November of 2001 and launched the Doha round with 
the declaration of the fourth Ministerial Conference. The declaration provides the work 
program for negotiations and specifically states that WTO members are determined to 
continue trade liberalization in order to promote economic development, to reduce 
poverty and foster recovery and growth during the slowdown of the world´s economy. 
The work program involves about 20 subjects1 to be negotiated and deals with issues 
regarding the implementations of the current WTO agreements that need to be solved. 
The issues were included particularly on request of developing countries (WTO, 2001). The 
original aim of the round was to conclude negations by January of 2005. Nevertheless, the 
deadline established for the negotiation was not met while the negotiations progressed 
and the Doha round stalled.  
 
Despite the stalling of Doha, countries have not stopped working to get free trade. They 
just changed their strategy and switched it from multilateral negotiations in the WTO to 
bilateral or regional negotiations through Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). A free trade 
agreement is “a preferential arrangement in which tariff rates among members are zero” 
(Krueger, 1997).  
 
The graph # 1 below displays the number of FTAs notified to the WTO by its members 
within 1992 and October of 2010. The graph shows that the number of FTAs increased 
after the failure of the negotiations that took place on the first term of the Doha round. In 
the first period of time between the establishment of the WTO (1995) and the year after 
the launch of the Doha round (2000), the number of FTAs notified to the WTO was thirty-
eight. Since the launch of the Doha round (2001) and its deadline (January, 2005), another 
                                                          
1 The subjects involve in the negotiations are: Agriculture, Services, Market access for non-agricultural 
products (NAMA), Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS), Relationship between trade 
and investment, Interaction between trade and competition policy, Transparency in government 
procurement, Trade facilitation, WTO rules: anti-dumping and subsidies, regional trade agreements, Dispute 
Settlement Understanding, Trade and environment,  Electronic commerce, Small economies, Trade, debt 
and finance, Trade and technology transfer, Technical cooperation and capacity building, Least-developed 
countries and Special and differential treatment. 
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thirty-eight FTAs were notified. However, after missing deadline, the number of FTAs 
notified to the WTO dramatically increased almost by 90%. 
 
 
Graph #1 
Number of FTAs notified to the WTO 
 
                                                                              Source: Own elaboration with WTO, RTA 
Database. 
 
The stalling of Doha led to a new strategy of international trade and changed the “rules of 
the game” and, therefore, the negotiation environment for Developing Countries.  It has 
shifted from multilateral negotiations where developing countries bargain with developed 
countries in a considerable less hierarchical system (Singh, 2000) to bilateral and regional 
negotiations characterized by power asymmetries between developed and developing 
countries, where the hierarchical system is more pronounced. It has also swapped free 
trade based on non-discriminative multilateral rules to selective and discriminative free 
trade. 
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These changes represent a missed opportunity for developing countries to continue the 
path of free trade in a less hierarchical system based on multilateral rules. 
The less hierarchical system can be evidenced in the WTO decision making process. In it, 
all the decisions are made by consensus and based on the sovereign equality of members. 
Thus, the decision making procedure offers equal representation and voting power to all 
WTO members (Steinberg, 2002: 339). In other words, it could be said that the WTO 
decision making system “eliminates” the asymmetries of power between its members. 
However, it does not eliminate the asymmetries. It just reduces them. 
 
One of the reasons why the decision making system does not eliminate the asymmetries 
of power can be found in the way the agenda of the negotiations is established. According 
with Steinberg (2002: 360), the agenda for the negotiations is made based on the interests 
of the powerful countries. It means that they decide which topics are going to be 
negotiated during the round. A clear example of this situation can be found in the Uruguay 
Round negotiation, where the developed countries included in the agenda Investment 
Measures (TRIMS), Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and Trade in Services (GATS) were 
against the interest of the developing countries (Wade, 2003). Nevertheless, the 
panorama changed in the Doha round.  In it, developing countries blocked the consensus 
necessary to launch the round until the agenda was “balanced”.  As a result, the agenda 
was modified; the Doha round was declared to have special concern for the interests of 
developing countries. Exceptions for public health in TRIPS and agricultural subsidies were 
included in the agenda (Echeverri-Gent, & Armijo, 2005: 10-11). Hence, even though 
developed countries have the power to construct the agenda, it can be modified by 
developing countries.  
 
Another reason is that most of the important decisions during the negotiations are made 
in the “green room” by a group of developed countries. The agreement made in the Green 
Room is presented to the rest of the WTO members and they usually accept it by 
consensus without modification or with only minor changes (Blackhurst, R. 1998). This 
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situation was evident in the negotiations at the GATT than in the WTO. Curzon & Curzon 
(1973) state that the United States and the European Community have dominated all the 
important decisions in the GATT negotiations. In order to solve this problem during Doha 
Round negotiations, developing countries have made coalitions and reduced the power 
asymmetries between them and the developed countries. During the Doha round more 
than 26 groups have been working actively during the negotiations according with specific 
necessities or topics (WTO, 2010 b). Indeed, the inclusion of the exceptions for public 
health in TRIPS in the Doha agenda was a positive result of the coalition of the developing 
countries. An alliance between developing countries and NGOs influenced the decision to 
include the declaration on TRIPS and public health (Mayne, 2002).  
 
Another problem of asymmetries between developed and developing countries that can 
be solved by creating coalitions is the lack of knowledge, economic resources and amount 
of people able to participate efficiently in the negotiations. For instance, the ASEAN group 
was created in order to share their limit resources, to cover all the negotiation meetings, 
to gather information and to improve their technical analyses (Blackhurst, et. al.1999). 
Thus the ASEAN group could overcome this asymmetry.  
 
As shown above, developing countries have reduced the bargaining asymmetries between 
them and the developed countries during the Doha round negotiations and have created a 
more equal decision making process. First, increasing their influence in setting the 
negotiation agenda and second, increasing their negotiation power and their efficiency by 
building coalitions.   
 
Nonetheless, when developed countries decided to increase the number of FTAs’ 
negotiations with developing countries, instead of continuing the negotiations under the 
Doha round, they changed the arena to free trade negotiations characterized by power 
asymmetries. In any agreement and especially in trade agreements, there is an inherent 
disadvantage when the arrangement is made between a rich and a poor country 
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(Deardorff & Stern, 2007: 21).  According to Lombaerde (2008), in a FTA between 
developed and developing countries, the FTA reflects more the interest of the first. 
Indeed, FTAs negotiated by the United States have been characterized by asymmetric 
reciprocity where the trading partner has had to make more “concessions” in obedience 
to the interest of the United States (Feinberg, 2003).  
 
The reason why developed countries are able to get more concessions is because they 
have more power and therefore, they set the FTA negotiation agenda (Orbie, 2007). In this 
agenda, they do not only include commitments to reduce tariff rates to zero but they also 
include additional topics like more protection to intellectual property rights, and labour 
and environmental standards. Even though, these topics are against the interest of the 
developing countries (Deardorff & Stern, 2007: 22) and go beyond the FTA definition, they 
include them and make it a single package. For example, in the FTA between the United 
States and Jordan, Jordan had to agree to go further in its commitments in the WTO and 
give more protection to intellectual property rights. Consequently, as an intellectual 
property importer, its terms of trade were harmed (Drahos, 2001).  
 
Some scholars argue that more protection to intellectual property rights does not 
generate mutual gain. They state also that “inadequate” protection does not lessen the 
creation of new technology or knowledge. Instead with more intellectual property rights 
protection the world´s welfare might be reduced (Bhagwati, 1993).  
 
Another major concern of developing countries is that developed countries, and 
particularly the United States and the European Union have been looking for more patent 
protection.  Therefore, developing countries are afraid that more protection will tie their 
hands to solve public health problems that have been solved by TRIPS flexibilities. For 
instance, when Thailand sought to produce generic medicine of patented drugs to 
promote public health, the United States threatened to impose trade sanctions (Collins-
Chase, 2008). A similar situation happened in South Africa. South Africa is the African 
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country that has the most people infected with HIV. In 1997, South Africa wanted to buy 
cheaper HIV/AIDS drugs that were patented by doing parallel importation. However, they 
could not do it because the United States threatened South Africa with possible trade 
sanctions (Drahos, 2003).  
 
Also, labour and environmental standards have been used against the interest of the 
developing countries since the negotiation to launch the Doha Round started (Krueger, 
1999). The consequence for developing countries in accepting these standards is that it 
generates an additional cost of production, increasing the final price of the product. The 
real concern behind labour and environmental standards is that, in actuality, it does not 
improve the life of the workers in the developing countries or protect the environment. As 
Bhagwati (2005) shows, workers in the United States are terrified to lose their jobs 
because companies might move to developing countries looking for high skill workers with 
lower wages. Thus, they want to increase wages in these countries by increasing labour 
standards. In other words, labour standards take away the opportunity to create new jobs 
in developing countries. Companies in the develop countries are afraid of losing markets 
as a result of cheaper and high quality goods produced in developing countries. Hence, 
they want developing countries to adopt environmental standards because it increases 
the cost of production and raise the final price. If the United States was truly concerned 
about the environment they would have signed the Kyoto protocol as some of the 
developing countries did.  
 
FTAs that include deeper and additional commitments are known as “WTO plus” because 
they go beyond the WTO agreements. However, not every agreement goes beyond and 
some strategic topics for developing countries like agricultural subsidies are excluded, 
creating an unbalanced negotiation agenda. 
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Agriculture is important for developing countries because it constitutes a source of 
employment, income and export earnings. Moreover, for some developing countries their 
export sector is mostly supported by agricultural products. Trade barriers to agricultural 
products and subsidies that developed countries give to their farmers have created a 
highly distorted world market, with instable commodities prices (Goldin & Knudsen, 1990) 
Indeed, subsidies encourage farmers to produce more than the demand, increasing the 
low-price tendency of the agriculture products (Aksoy & Beghin, 2005). Low agricultural 
prices deteriorate the terms of trade of the developing countries that depend on 
agriculture exports. Furthermore, it reduces their income, exports earnings, creates 
unemployment and hampers countries that have a comparative advantage in agricultural 
products. 
 
In general, all new FTAs negotiated by the European Union and the United States are WTO 
plus (Koopmann & Wilhelm, 2010) and the strategic topics for developing countries are 
left to be negotiated under the Doha Round (Feinberg, 2003). Developed countries set the 
agenda as a result of the developing countries lack of power and they have little chance to 
improve the situation by creating coalitions. 
 
An additional problem with FTAs between developing countries and major powers is that 
with the aim of “success” in negotiations, developing countries require a lot more 
preparation, resources and coordination with different domestic agencies than those 
required in the Doha Round negotiation (Sally, 2008). 
 
Moreover, in contrast to the Doha Round, it is almost impossible for developing countries 
to build coalitions in FTAs in order to solve this asymmetry. Because FTAs are usually 
bilateral or regional among few countries, the chances to conform a coalition that 
balances the power is absent.  
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Besides an unbalanced agenda and the impossibility to form coalitions, another issue that 
developing countries have to face is that FTAs are “inherently preferential and 
discriminatory” (Bhagwati, 1995). It means that unlike the Doha Round negotiations, 
developed countries can decided with which country to negotiate an agreement and 
hence give preferential access to his rich market. It also means they can take away from 
some developing countries the possibility to have preferential market access, and 
therefore reduce their competitiveness. Due to this fact, FTAs are especially likely to be 
formed between allies (Gowa, 1994).  
 
Discriminative FTAs have also been used by powerful developed countries to consolidate 
their political influence over developing countries (Mansfield & Milner, 1999). Because 
powerful developed countries have the richest and largest markets and the possibility to 
choose with which country negotiate the FTA, they take advantage of it and use it as stick 
and carrot strategy. If the developing country does not behave as an ally, they will not 
negotiate the FTA. But if they behave as an ally they probably will. For instance, as Rosen 
(2004) explains, the FTA negotiated between the United States and Israel was a pilot 
project to prove the effectiveness of FTAs as carrots. This project has evolved and one of 
the current US criteria to negotiate a FTA is to reward friends (Schott, 2004). 
 
Since FTAs give preferential market access to its members, trading partners who are not 
part of the agreement can lose the market. The explicit risk of loss creates an additional 
pressure for developing countries, which often depend on the developed countries 
markets to be part of the agreement. Developed countries understand this situation and 
use it to influence countries behaviours according to their own interest. 
 
In contrast, in the WTO developed countries cannot discriminate between any of its 153 
members and have to behave according with the multilateral rules that have been agreed 
to. One of the main and more important principles at the WTO is the Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) principle. It is a non-discrimination principle which states that normally none of the 
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WTO members can give a preferential or a worst treatment to any of the other members 
(WTO, 2010 c). In other words, whatever grant a developed country gives to its allies has 
to give it also to its enemies.  
 
This principle assures that regardless of the political structure, the size of the economy, or 
other characteristic of the country, all of the WTO members will be treated equally. Thus, 
developed countries cannot use the WTO agreements as a stick and carrot strategy. If 
developing countries could keep the free trade path under the WTO and concluded a 
positive Doha Round negotiation, they will reduce the influence of the developed 
countries.   
 
In the WTO, the MFN is a rule but it has some exceptions. The exceptions that allow 
preferential and discriminatory FTAs are set out in Article XXIV of the GATT 1947, the 
enabling clause and Article V of the GATS. Thus, WTO members can go from non-
discriminative and multilateral rules to preferential and discriminatory FTAs, without 
violating any of the WTO agreements (WTO, 2010 d).  
 
Bhagwati (2000) also argue that FTAs are trade diverting2. He shows that many labour-
intensive goods exported by developing countries have high tariff rates in developed 
countries. And some goods that are usually imported by developing countries from the 
developed ones have also high tariff rates. Thus, when the FTA comes into force it creates 
trade diversion. The problem associated with trade diversion is that it goes against the 
basic assumption of the absolute advantage theory and the competitive advantage theory, 
consisting in an efficient resource allocation generated by free trade. As a result the 
wealth of the world will decrease. So, taking into account that developing countries 
                                                          
2 Trade diversion happens when a country who originally supplies a good is replaced for a country member 
of a trade agreement, because the later is cheaper. Not because his products are more competitive and 
have a lower price but as a result of the lower tariffs (Viner, 1950). In this situation the more competitive 
country lose a market since he is not part of the agreement and has to pay a tariff which increases his price. 
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decided to move toward free trade based on these theories3, FTAs might not be the right 
path to follow.  
 
In the WTO, multilateral trade rules and MFN assure that the agreements, instead of 
diverting trade, will create trade4. If the 153 members of the WTO lower their tariff rates 
and reduce or remove the non-tariff barriers to trade, the whole world would be richer as 
the final output increase as a consequence of the efficient resource allocation and country 
specialization. 
 
Even though FTAs have an unbalance agenda that benefits more developed countries than 
developing countries, these are WTO plus, and divert trade, while in the WTO and 
specifically in the Doha Round, developing countries have reduced the bargaining 
asymmetries and created a more equal decision making process. Developing countries 
keep negotiating FTAs because they fear being left behind and having their 
competitiveness undermined. With the stalling of the Doha Round they do not have any 
better alternative than to continue the path of free trade.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have shown that as an alternative to Doha Round stalling developed 
countries decided to negotiate more FTAs with developing countries. Consequently, 
multilateral negotiations, where developing countries bargain with developed countries in 
a considerable less hierarchical system, were replaced by bilateral and regional 
negotiations characterized by power asymmetries. Also, non-discriminative multilateral 
rules were substituted by preferential and discriminative trade rules. 
 
                                                          
3 See Milner (1999) and Rodrick (1994). 
4 Trade creation takes place when a country, who originally supplies a good, because it has preference 
access to the market, is replaced for a country that makes the good more efficiently and could not be able to 
supply the good before because of the tariff.  
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In doing so, developing countries have had to accept FTAs with an unbalanced agenda 
while agreeing to more intellectual property rights´ protection, labour and environmental 
standards as well as excluding agricultural subsidies. They are also losing the opportunity 
of continuing trade negotiations at the multilateral level where the decision making 
process is more equal, where they can influence the negotiation agenda, raise their 
bargaining power by building coalitions and improve their efficiency during the 
negotiations.  
 
Finally, preferential, discriminative and trade diverting FTAs are used by developed 
countries as stick and carrot strategy. For all of these aspects, it can be said that the 
stalling of the Doha Round is a missed opportunity for developing countries. 
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